For a year, Bosnian policy has been bedeviled by a lingering confusion which has complicated the search for a settlement and soured relations between civilians and the military. The confusion is between two views on Bosnia, both legitimate, both held with passion. Neither side of this debate believes that the birth of Greater Serbia represents a strategic threat to the United States. But one view holds that Serb aggression and ethnic cleansing should not be rewarded; the other argues that it is imperative, above all, to stop the fighting. It was “moralists” like national-security adviser Anthony Lake and U.N. Ambassador Madeleine Albright who advanced the first view; they dreamed of a multiethnic Bosnia and last year wanted to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian Muslims and bomb Serb positions. A second view has been held by “realists” in the CIA and Pentagon, with allies in Europe. In the hard word of repolitik, the Serbs won their war in the winter of 1992-93; the central aim of policy should be to end the fighting, quickly, and prevent new Balkan hostilities.
The tension between differing goals for Bosnia has sent mixed messages. It encouraged some in the Bosnian government to think that moralist America would one day come, like the cavalry, to its rescue, bombing the Serbs and lifting the arms embargo. That chilled relations between civilians and the military. Only Lt. Gen. Sir Michael Rose, the head of NATO forces in Bosnia, has ever publicly said that the Bosnian government “wants us to fight their war for them.” But many in the Pentagon think this is where moralism leads, and they resent it. Since Vietnam, the Pentagon has been skittish about committing force in support of a poorly defined policy. Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff until last year, believed that military power should be applied massively or not at all, and only in pursuit of a clear political goal. Last summer he told the administration that air power alone could not relieve the siege of Sarajevo; nearly 50,000 American troops would be needed.
Time has resolved much of the tension between the two views. Powell’s successor, Gen. John Shalikashvili, is prepared to countenance limited military intervention in support of political goals. With Shalikashvili at the helm, the siege of Sarajevo was lifted in February not by 50,000 troops but by threatening the bombardment of Serb artillery. And after another year of bloodshed in Bosnia, everyone-almost everyone, anyway-is now a realist.
Since January Secretary of State Warren Christopher has been pushing a realist policy. He wants the Bosnian government to declare its bottom line on a territorial settlement, while threatening force to deter further Serb aggression. in London last week, Christopher met with representatives of the European Union and Russia to set up a “contact group” designed to secure a peace. America is not acting independently but as part of a team, and as Christopher knows very well, you could search the corridors of Moscow, Paris and London for years without finding a single moralist. The contact group’s representatives have been meeting the parties in Bosnia. The Americans are not yet prepared to force a particular territorial division on the Muslims (this is moralism’s last stand). But the United States, Russia and the Europeans agree that the territory of Bosnia should be divided so that the Croat-Muslim alliance has 51 percent and the Bosnian Serbs 49 percent.
The rise of realism is a relief for the Pentagon. Military leaders think that, as part of NATO’s effort, they have been asked to maintain a standoff between forces on the ground while the Muslims and Serbs are pressured into a cease-fire. That is a political goal with which the Pentagon can live.
So far, though, the diplomatic pressure has delivered little. Administration sources say that both the Bosnian government and Bosnian Serbs are more intransigent in their territorial demands than they were before the siege of Gorazde. The Serbs are moving heavy weapons into the narrow Brcko corridor, which links Serb-held territory. Moreover, to the frustration of U.N. officials in Bosnia, not all moralist voices in Washington have yet been silenced. One such voice is the president’s. At a press conference on April 20, Clinton said many things, but cavalry watchers in Sarajevo would have heard this: “I have always favored lifting the arms embargo. And I am glad that there is so much support for it in the Congress.” Sure, Clinton went on to say why the embargo would not be lifted soon. But will someone please tell the president that at such a crucial moment in Bosnian diplomacy, he might keep his moralizing to himself?
